Abstract
This article presents a new framework to analyze linguistic relations of power that examines the linguistic effects of what Aníbal Quijano has theorized as “the coloniality of power.” The argument is organized in two sections. The first section introduces “the coloniality of language,” an expression the author uses to refer to the process of racialization of colonized populations as communicative agents beginning in the sixteenth century and continuing until today. This section includes an account of the language and communication paradigm being developed at the time of the Conquest, which, the author argues, contains the coloniality inside. In the second section, the author proposes to shift paradigms to get outside the “conceptual and social prison” of modernity/coloniality and understand colonized-colonialized languages and colonized-colonialized speakers differently. The conclusion illustrates some ideas and concerns about accessing and fostering decolonial alternatives that come forth from the article’s critical analysis.

Keywords: modernity/coloniality, race, language, simple communication and simple communicator, monolanguaging

Introduction
This article theorizes the relation between race and language through the Modernity/Coloniality-Decoloniality conceptual and methodological frame. The intent is to present a framework to analyze linguistic relations of power that underscores the importance of colonialism in the Americas as a relational mode continuously rearticulated and reactivated until today. In the
last three decades, the Modernity/Coloniality-Decoloniality (MCD) collective project has pursued the implications of an epistemic “Decolonial Turn” that assumes the perspectives and life experiences of peoples from the Global South as points of departure to a critique of the failures of Eurocentered modernity. Formed as a network of U.S. Latina/o, Latin American, and Caribbean scholars who come from a variety of disciplines, the collective project presents itself as a type of critical theory that does not fit into a linear history of paradigms or epistemes. On the contrary, it is a way of doing critical theory that locates its own inquiry in the complexity articulated in political praxis, where culture, economy, identity, alterity, doxa, and episteme converge. Put differently, the MCD project purports to develop a geopolitical perspective on the question of reason from a specific time and space; that is, from a locus of enunciation that is not that of a particular author but of the Other who have been historically marginalized or ignored. From this perspective, the project destabilizes the modern Eurocentered subject of reason while positioning the subaltern as an epistemic force with possibilities of generating knowledge.

The MCD collective project moves in two simultaneous directions. One is analytic. Articulated around the notion of “coloniality of power,” the project describes the living legacy of 16th century colonialism in contemporary societies, in the form of racialized organization of society that outlived formal colonialism and became integrated in succeeding social orders. Put differently, this analytic direction looks to understand the past in order to excavate the dark side of domination, where racialization of inter-subjective social relations, and the control of knowledge, labor, land, and nature are revealed as the operations of power over colonized-colonialized peoples and over which Europe has built itself as modernity. The second direction of the MCD collective is programmatic. Articulated around the notion of “decoloniality”, the overall, long-term project is “to decolonize all areas of the colonial matrix of power to release the fullness of human relationships” (Mignolo, 2013, para. 2). In other words, this programmatic direction is not about dictating a counter-hegemonic global design, nor about denying the contributions Western civilization and
Eurocentered modernity to the history of human kind, but about opening up the option for other logics of thinking, doing, and living that emanate from the various subjects disenfranchised by modern/colonial racism.

The main aim of this article is to move in the analytical direction and open up some of the theoretically necessary questions about the implications of coloniality regarding the relations between language and power. Nonetheless, the conclusion will suggest some ideas and concerns about fostering decolonial projects that come forth from this analysis. In what follows, I begin with an understanding of race and racialization within the MCD frame, and then move to the domain of language and expressivity.

**The modernity/coloniality/decoloniality historical theory of race**

Decolonial theorists historicize race rather than understand it as a concept or experience or phenomenon. They periodize the history of race as beginning in the 16th century. This periodization focuses the historical juncture of the colonization of the Americas and the development of capitalism as the beginning of racialization as inferiority by nature rather than conquest. A key notion in this periodization is the above-mentioned “coloniality of power” introduced by Aníbal Quijano (1989) to theorize global Eurocentered capitalism.

Quijano’s model presents global Eurocentered capitalist power as articulated around two axes: coloniality and modernity (Quijano, 2000b, p. 342). These axes organize the meaning and forms of control and domination in every domain of social existence. The axis of coloniality introduces the basic and universal social classification of the world’s population in terms of the idea of “race.” According to Quijano (2000a), the invention of “race” is pivotal as it transformed relations of superiority and inferiority that had been previously understood as the product of war, domination, and power, and turned them into biological, ahistorical, natural, phenomena. The introduction of this racial classification transformed and re-organized all social relations in the colonial society producing new social and geo-cultural identities (“Indian,” “Black,” and
“Mestizo”) and redefining others (“Spanish,” “Portuguese,” and “European”) (Quijano, 2000a, p. 534). These racial identities were constitutive of all the multiple hierarchies in the 16th century colonial order. The colonial/imperial Eurocentered enterprises of the following centuries (Netherlands, 17th; France and Britain, 18th; United States, 20th) expanded the racial classification to the entire population of the planet (“Yellow” and “Olive”) (Quijano, 2000a, p. 537). In this sense, coloniality is not just about racial classification but an encompassing global phenomenon that permeates all and every aspect and situation of social existence in the sense that the distribution of hierarchies, places, and social roles are thoroughly racialized and geographically differentiated. For example, in the economic domain, coercive or cheap labor is done by non-European/non-white people at the periphery while the capital-wage relation of labor is concentrated in Europe and among Europeans/whites (Grosfoguel, 2009, p. 20). Here we see the coloniality of labor as a thorough articulation of “race” and forms of labor with a view to the production of profit and the accumulation of capital.

In Quijano’s model, modernity is the other axis of global, Eurocentered capitalism, and it refers to the specific universe of inter-subjective relations of domination under the hegemony of European/white agents and institutions. In characterizing modernity, Quijano focuses on the production of a way of knowing adequate to the cognitive needs of capitalism (everything can be measured, made equivalent for the sake of exchange.) Modernity and coloniality act in partnership: to the process of modernity ideologically constructing the world in a way that always accommodates the coloniality by introducing institutions that reduce colonized-colonialized peoples in their flesh and in their practices to beings that are by nature inferior. In other words, this perspective of knowledge, “Eurocentrism,” naturalizes the experiences of people within this model of power (Quijano, 2000b, p. 343).

This word, “to naturalize,” is crucial in understanding the inextricable relation that Quijano establishes between both axes of power. Naturalizing is a making, a process of manufacturing an inter-subjective understanding of the experience of coloniality. To say “it is natural” is here
unpacked as “it is produced and part of the production is constituted by a cognitive framework that hides the production itself, and renders the appearance of its being given, non-made, and non-artificial.” Turning the colonized into non-human or less-than-human beings was not a conscious, intentional act on behalf of the colonizer. Instead of intentional acts, what Quijano’s theory uncovers is an articulation between slavery or serfdom as a mode of production that was reserved for beings that were brutish and strong, and a kind of treatment that accustomed them to negotiate those conditions. This articulation, which is the articulation between modernity and coloniality, has continued, albeit with significant changes in time, space, and colonial experience, until the present and is constitutive of the continuity of capitalism. Arturo Escobar (2004) came up with the term “modernity/coloniality” to signify and characterize the articulation between both axes of power. It means both inseparability—coloniality is constitutive of modernity and there is no modernity without coloniality—and double-sidedness—modernity is the light, visible side of the history of global, Eurocentered capitalism, and coloniality is dark, hidden side.

Methodologically, the MCD framework stresses the primacy of the material aspects of the construction of reality. In this respect, we can think of the articulation modernity/coloniality as a paradigm, a framework that is constitutive both of the perception of the colonizer and of the structure of power that enables that perception to function in reading and navigating reality. The understanding of colonized populations as less than human beings constitutes the content of this paradigm. But in giving it that “name,” paradigm we are already recognizing it as such: as one powerful construction of the real that is pressed upon people who become “the colonized.” In respect to theorizing race, the MCD perspective and historical approach—and this is crucial to my own focus on the relation between race and language—underscores a difference and a complementary relationship between the classification of people according to the idea of race and the long-term process of dehumanizing colonized populations: Race is a mental construction that prescribes a natural inequality between peoples/societies, attributing value to
certain peoples/societies while disenfranchising others. In this sense, race is a fiction. The classification of races is not a historical affair. It is a priori as it were. It happens in history yes, but it has no historical background, it is not the result of history but just an imposition. Racialization is the long-term process that makes the fiction real. It is the process of producing such classification through modern institutions, laws, treatments, practices, and desires that place those who are disfranchised in situations and relations adequate only to beings/societies who are inferior, in contrast with the superior civilized, human, colonizers. That is, institutions, treatments, laws, and desires that practice the reduction. Put differently, race refers to a classification that dictates “this being is not human” or “is less than human”; racialization is the process that dehumanizes, the processes of dehumanization that reduce people by putting them in situations and relations that stripe them of their humanity.6

In the next section I introduce the hypothesis of a “coloniality of language” and investigate whether the reduction through racial transformation fits the process of colonization as a linguistic process.

The coloniality of language
The theoretical understanding enabled by Quijano’s theory of power suggests, even entails, a difficulty in understanding colonized peoples as communicative agents beyond the most rudimentary of communicative possibilities. To find in colonized peoples the ability to express complex cosmological, social, scientific, erotic, economic meaning is at odds with their reduction to inferior, animal-like beings. Put differently, if the idea of race constructs the perception of the colonizers, then the colonized must have been for them less than human beings, and thus without any complex form of communication, that is without language.

We can affirm that in the colonial encounter the colonizers perceived indigenous peoples in speaking their tongues as doing less than being able to express knowledge. The question is how much less. This question takes us to investigate what lays between language as expressive of knowledge and
infantile, primitive meaning expression. It also takes us into the linguistic paradigm being developed at that time within the political confines of the Spanish crown.

The turn of the sixteenth century marked a crucial turn in Spain’s linguistic state of affairs. It is the moment of the celebration of the Castilian vernacular. Elio Antonio de Nebrija played an important role in the transformation of Castilian by writing its grammar. Until then, only classical languages had grammars. When offering his *Gramática de la lengua castellana* (1492/1946) to Queen Isabella of Castile, Nebrija laid out in the preface the purposes that his work would serve:

Now, Your Majesty, let me come to the last advantage that you shall gain from my grammar. For the purpose, recall the time when I presented you with a draft of the book earlier this year in Salamanca. At this time, you asked me what end such a grammar could possibly serve. Upon this the bishop of Avila interrupted to answer in my stead. What he said was this: “Soon your Majesty will have placed her yoke upon many barbarians who speak outlandish tongues. By this, your victory, these people shall stand in a new need; the need for the laws the victor owes to the vanquished, and the need for the language we shall bring.” My grammar shall serve to impart them the Castilian tongue, as we have used grammar to teach Latin to our young (as cited in Mignolo, 1995, p. 38).

Nebrija was a Renaissance humanist formed in the ideals and arts of the Greco-Latin tradition. Giving Castilian an *ars grammatica* was to “move it up” from the vulgar status because vulgar languages had no use of grammar. A grammar is an instrument to teach a language. To give a language a grammar presupposes that language is to be taught and the importance of its being learned. Does it also entail that, unlike
vulgar languages, it can express knowledge? Vulgar languages were learned on the streets. Castilian was to be taught at school, like Latin and Greek. The people and territory that Nebrija had originally in mind as beneficiaries of his grammar were not across the Atlantic. Columbus had not set sail yet. Nebrija’s grammar was directed to the political unification of the kingdom of Castile that had just achieved its final victory of the Christian Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula from Muslim control, in Granada in January 1492.

Nevertheless, we might venture the claim that ten months later, indigenous peoples must have sounded to the Spanish conquerors and colonizers, at best, as speaking vulgar tongues. That is, they could, at best, have sounded as those many barbarians in the peninsula who spoke “outlandish tongues.” As a language with a grammar, Castilian was presented to the Queen as the language with which the Crown would impart its order on its empire. Castilian was then the language that would unify the empire, but significantly it would express its authority, its order, its political truth. Certainly vulgar, barbarian, and thus indigenous tongues could not express the order of the Spanish empire. Thus we can venture our claim because the status of languages is at this time a political matter. The question remains whether Castilian could express knowledge, as Latin, Greek, and Hebrew could and whether its superiority lies in expressing political authority or knowledge. The question then becomes: what is to be taught in Castilian? Does what is to be taught in Castilian separate animal-like beings from human beings? Only then can we move from the political superiority of Castilian over indigenous languages to a superiority linking it to knowledge production and expression. We need to find whether there is a connection in Nebrija between giving Castilian an *ars grammatica* and pursuing the possibility that knowledge could be expressed in Castilian. The fact that until then the only languages that had grammars—Latin, Greek, and Hebrew—were the same languages in which knowledge was expressed backs up this possibility. Did Nebrija, in giving Castilian a grammar, in unveiling it as a language with capital L, think that Castilian was becoming a language that could be used not only for the political enterprise of unifying the empire but also for
epistemological enterprise of expressing knowledge rather than opinion? It is important that the political enterprise included the expression of law and order. If this is correct, if to Nebrija what made a language a language of knowledge (a peer of Latin) was that it can have a grammar, we could have an understanding of the relationship between having knowledge, having a language that expresses this knowledge, and being an adult, rational communicator, to be contrasted to the perception of indigenous peoples as not having knowledge, not having languages, and being, what later on I will explain in terms of, “simple communicators.”

It is important to look at another Renaissance humanist, Bernardo de Aldrete also devoted to the transformation of Castilian into a valorized tongue. In his Del origen y principio de la lengua castellana o romance que oí se usa en España (1606/1972-75), Aldrete’s main thesis was that Castilian was born from Latin and, though it was corrupted by the Visigoths, this could not alter the more profound connections between classical Latin, Christianity, and knowledge, which was transferred to Castilian (as cited in Mignolo, 1995, p. 30). Thus, at least in Aldrete’s position, Castilian is indeed a language of knowledge because it is the daughter of Latin. But as Walter Mignolo (1995) points out, Aldrete also made a clear connection between Castilian—like Latin—being an alphabetic language and the question of civility. Aldrete made the—for our purposes—crucial claim that indigenous peoples lacked letters and the civility that went together with letters and that they went naked as beasts (as cited and commented in Mignolo, 1995, p. 34). Mignolo uncovers the important presupposition that enables Aldrete’s to connect going naked with lacking letters. Civility is the connection. Civility is indicated both by having letters and by the manner of one’s dress. Indigenous peoples lacked both. The lack is not superficial since uncivil speech and uncivil clothing (or lack of clothing) are outward manners indicative of the inner person, as Norbert Elias (1978) indicates (as cited in Mignolo, 1995, p. 34). Thus lacking letters and clothing were incompatible with humanity. Lack of civility is tantamount to bestiality. Given the Renaissance association between alphabetic writing and civility, we can see to what extent “the way people spoke, the way people looked,
the way human beings should behave” (Mignolo, 1995, p. 35. Emphasis added) influenced the colonizers’ descriptions of indigenous peoples’ social life and personal conduct, and to what extent it determined the disqualification indigenous communicators as human beings.

I raised these questions not so much to answer them but, rather, to create a theoretical environment that points to a framework within which these questions make sense. I am investigating the relation between language and humanity, given the denial of humanity that constitutes the idea of race. The inquiry is about the consequences of the fit introduced by the coloniality of power at the level of language: how it conditions what a language is; how the classification of people into races that are superior and inferior is accompanied by thinking of the expressive tools that they have also in terms of superiority and inferiority. The questions raised about Nebrija’s and Aldrete’s arguments are the corpus of my hypothesis on the coloniality of language in the sense that they give an account of these conditions. They do not perform a classification of languages in the Aristotelian sense but, rather, they tell us about the philosophical linguistic criteria that began to be produced for that inferiority and superiority in the 16th century. For example, the family relationship to traditional languages of superiority which are God given and thus can express the truth. So, when looking at the languages of beings that are bestial from these criteria, these are not languages. This is key in our understanding of the linguistic aspects of the coloniality. The rationale of the criteria performs racialization. The languages of the colonized are thus not understood as different languages but placed in the relation of what Mignolo (2000) calls “the colonial difference,” which I interpret as the colonial prescription of superiority and inferiority that turns differences into values. What it is being prescribed at this point is a relation between language and territory, language and power, language and writing, and language and god. The languages of the colonizers were languages, Spanish was a language; the languages of the colonized were something inferior.

Nebrija’s and Aldrete’s arguments are important to think about the racialization of languages because they set the conditions for what makes language “a real language” that the
languages of colonized populations cannot fulfill precisely because of the colonality of power; that is, because colonized people have been classified as inferior people. In these arguments we get a sense of what it means to say in the 16th (first modernity) that a language is or is not “human” in some fundamental sense.

Now that we have a seen the connection between humanity, civility, letters, grammar, and knowledge secured in people who have language in the fullest sense of the word developed at the time of the Conquest, we can ask what forms the reduction through racial transformation take in respect to language and expressivity. Put differently, if given coloniality, the languages of the colonized are not languages, what are they?

I want make a distinction between being “without language” and being a “simple communicator.” Simple communicators engage in “simple communication,” a term I coin to convey infantile, primitive meaning expression. “Simple communicators” go beyond mimicking sounds as parrots do. They also go beyond enacting what is inscribed in their DNA’s, as bees or ants do, engaging in complex collective tasks that depend on inscribed codes without consciousness or reflection. “Simple communication” reveals a degree of consciousness and even self-consciousness. “Simple communicators” make sounds or gestures that have meaning. The meaning is not necessarily merely denotative meaning, pointing, but it is not, it is less than dialogical rational communication.

I introduced these terms to capture the colonial fiction. “Simple communication” is a fiction that imagines the colonized as less than human communicatively. That is, there are no characteristics that made colonized populations “simple communicators” or their languages, means of “simple communication.” There are characteristics the colonizers thought colonized peoples had that made them communicatively inferior and their languages not fully languages. I have explained that the colonality of power is a structure of power that affects the logic of perception. The hypothesis I am presenting interrogates precisely that. I have been teasing out questions about the colonizers’ linguistic and
communicative perception. How is it that they came to think linguistically and expressively of colonized peoples as inferiors beings, and of their languages as inferior languages? These questions look at colonized peoples and their forms of expressivity with the eyes of the colonizers, and, at the same time, they look at the formation of the colonizers’ own images of themselves as “humans” and of their languages as “real languages.” So, in a way, the questions practice, exercise the coloniality. I look at the inter-subjective colonial world theoretically through the modernity/coloniality material and epistemic framework. The questions arise as I place myself within colonial society and as I consider the inter-subjectivity of colonial society from a meta-position that addresses colonial linguistic domination.

I have not related the coloniality of language to a definition of language. The coloniality of language is an aspect of the process of dehumanizing colonized people through racialization. Because racialization is inseparable from the Eurocentric appropriation and reduction of the universe of the colonized, the relation between language and racialization is performed within a Eurocentric philosophy, ideology and politics, which include a politics of language. From within, the enormous epistemological-ideological apparatus of modernity enables the colonial imagination to presuppose the colonized linguistically and expressively as less than human. The renaissance Eurocentric idea of language linked language, grammar, civilization, letter, and knowledge and naturalized these as characteristics and attributes of what “language” is. Thus, a definition of language at this point would beg the question, as it would hide the outside of coloniality and of modernity. That the colonizers had Language is incontrovertible from within, as is their reduction of the expressivity of the colonized as such. To think the colonized from within I introduced the terms “simple communication” and “simple communicator” to capture the colonizer’s imagination of the colonized as having no Language, that is, no Eurocentrically valorized expressivity.

To say this is not to say that from within the modern/colonial paradigm one understands the construction of people as racially inferior. Rather racial inferiority is
naturalized; it is a matter of nature; it is given. Also, from within the modern/colonial paradigm it is not the case that one arrives at the conclusion that the languages of the colonized are inferior languages; rather their inferiority is a presupposition. We can agree with María Lugones that coloniality constitutes “a conceptual and social prison” (personal communication, Spring, 2010). I will not argue within this paradigm. I am looking for a way out of the prison in order to both uncover the prison and access a mode of conceptualizing language such that I can speak about the question of whether or not indigenous peoples are rational communicators. The answer to that question cannot be presupposed. If it could, the coloniality of language would not be a problem. We could just ignore it. Rather, it is a matter of disentangling the answer from the conceptual prison that coloniality of language is. Put differently, one can inhabit reality in such a way that one has no doubt that peoples of the African Diaspora and indigenous peoples of the Americas do have languages in the full sense and are humans. But I am now looking for a conceptual paradigm that will enable me to argue this, besides having the experience and the conviction of it. It is only from outside Eurocentric philosophy, ideology and politics that we can understand racializing and the terms of coloniality as invisibilizing, disappearing, reducing, eliminating colonized meaning. Shifting paradigms will enable me to uncover and explore linguistic relations of power. I need an account of languages outside the logic of coloniality. But the shift cannot be merely a relativistic move. One cannot just ignore the coloniality. That which is in the exteriority of coloniality cannot be presupposed. If it could, my hypothesis would fail.

In the next section I present Chilean biologist and philosopher Humberto Maturana’s notion of “languaging” to introduce a conceptual shift that enables to understand language differently. That is, in a way that is different from the communicative reality informed by the logic of linguistic coloniality and the colonial differentiation between superior and inferior expressivity. At the same time, in exercising the paradigm I am seeking to move to a different logic to look at the world of modern/colonial capitalism in a way that we can see it as system of power exercised in the making of the real.
This would allow for future investigations on the long-term historical production of linguistic coloniality: how communicative activities and efforts have been transformed as people have been racialized through legal, political, educational, labor, and civil institutions. And also, how those transformations have been rejected and resisted, and contested at many different levels and with diverse logics.

**Uncovering the coloniality of language**

I take the term “languaging” from Maturana as a way of thinking in which language is not already thought as a finished product but, rather, as an ongoing and situated activity. Though Maturana uses both “to language” and “languaging” without a shift in meaning, I am emphasizing the gerund, expressing a continuous, on-going mode. I will take this move from noun to verb to both, counterpoint the monologic of meaning of coloniality and move to the plurilogic and multiplicity of meanings of the new paradigm.

Language, the noun, is given; it precedes interaction and presupposes commonality. In the case of the colonial languages that commonality encloses a people whose language is. Language as institutionalized, as having a grammar, as being the language of a particular empire or nation closes interaction that attempts to complicate the manyness, heterogeneity of users and the users’ interactions. Languaging, the verb, instead has change, ongoingness at its center. So, meaning is not given. Moreover, the tie between meaning and languaging has complexities, including complexities tied to power, that interactions among the users have. Meaning is created through these interactions.

What makes the paradigm shift is that instead of seeing something produced with features that are decided upon those with power and who tied power and knowledge, in languaging we see the enactment of expressivity and communication itself. The move does not allow language to stand alone. There is no languaging in the abstract. As praxis it is always done by someone in a particular time and space. That is, languaging is always understood to be attached to the materiality of everyday life, which provides us with a way of understanding the
practices and experiences of the interlocutors. I will tie this understanding of the verbal quality of languaging to what Maturana calls “ways of living.”

One of the ways in which Maturana explains “languaging” is as the fundamental action in relation to human beings’ social interaction (1990, p. 29). It is fundamental because, to him, we (human beings) live because we language. He understands that the relation between “to live” and “to language” is not logic-deductive but generative. Language is not a property that human bodies have. It is not something that takes place in the body but, rather, in social dynamics (1990, pp. 24-25). Thus, to speak of the action “to language” is always to speak of an inter-action, and not just an interaction but *the* interaction that serves as basis for all social interactions among human beings. Languaging is the way in which human beings live together as they live together (1999, p. 44). This does not make human beings “better” than other living beings, though different in their ways of living. What is peculiar about the human way of living is that we live a simultaneous double dimension of experience: the first is immediate experience, which occurs in all living beings and according to which something simply happens to us; the second, which only occurs in human beings, is explanation of that experience, which takes place in language (Ruiz, 1997, para. 18). To see languaging is then to see ongoing, “recursive” processes of people living in communities generating different worlds and realities as different manners of living together.\(^9\)

All of this has the following implications for understanding what happens when peoples language: 1) languaging is the interaction that serves as basis for all social interactions and nothing exists outside language; 2) languaging is not an instrument of representation but of bringing about and moving in, a space of coexistence; 3) there is an ontological inseparability between ways of languaging and ways of living and knowing; 4) words do not represent (signify) but offer suggestion, and what is suggest is not only a matter of meaning but most crucial of sociality. As a result, the outcome of a conversation cannot be predicted as if what is communicated traveled in a sealed tube; 5) the problem of communication is primarily about recognition and disposition to communicate;
the production of communication presupposes that beings can communicate.

What Maturana’s framework enables us to do is to look at the very same peoples about whom modernity/coloniality tells us are not quite human beings, and therefore cannot speak any language that is a “real language,” and to look at them and what they do outside the colonial matrix of power and its conceptual and linguistic constrictions, as people who language. In this sense there is an epistemological shift that enables us to see not “simple communicators” but beings that are sort of made anew through the perspective of languaging. I go to Maturana because his idea of languaging discloses the relation between language as a verb and ways of living. It is through languaging as communal activity, through languaging together that people bring forth reality. This gives an understanding of linguistic communities, of people existing through languaging and performing particular ways of living together, spaces of coexistence being collectively (re)created and moved. It shows an exteriority that wasn’t there before, that is, inside the colonial/modern paradigm. And, given the relationship between languaging and ways of knowing, it allows walking inside non-Eurocentric worlds of meaning and knowledges in spite if the fact that the modern hides everything through the denial of the communal act.

However, because Maturana conditions the social space of languaging as strictly a consensual space, and because from his perspective the togetherness is exclusively one of mutual affirmation, parity, co-operation, and willingness, at some point we need to go beyond his position, and towards a framework that would satisfactory deal with colonial situations, which imply bringing to the foreground domination, resistance, adaptation, and hybridization. For us those interactions where parity and willingness to communicate are not given, as well as interactions across worlds of meaning that are not accessible to the interlocutors, interactions from systems of meaning that are in relations of power, interactions that begin from more than one system of meaning, hybrid communication, transculturality, creolization, are all crucial to the paradigm shift. So, while these communicative situations do not count as languaging processes for Maturana, he gives us the tools to
express them and then to argue for their failure in colonial situations. By shifting paradigm, we can argue that the coloniality of language produces a disposition against communication by assuming possible interlocutors to be “simple communicators” and their languages to be rudimentary expressive tools. The key point here is that we will see it as a production and not as given.

I inquire into a theoretical understanding of the historical material production of linguistic coloniality through Maturana’s idea of languaging to see a way of life that dehumanizes. I want to close this article by introducing the concept of “monolanguaging,” a way of living together that includes one-way communication that dehumanizes the colonized interlocutor. “Monolanguaging” to name the material and discursive praxes of linguistic racialization from the perspective of languaging. With this concept I want to convey more than monolingualism (i.e. knowing or using only one language.) As I have described earlier, the classification of people into superior and inferior races was accompanied by thinking of the expressive tools that they have also in terms of superiority and inferiority. I have described as well the criteria that began to be produced for that superiority and inferiority by renaissance humanists. Thus, when the Spaniards invaded other places, the people that lived in those places spoke, but the colonizers did not and could not consider what these peoples did in anyway as using a language of knowledge or a real language because to be a real language it had to be written in letters, it had to be in the Latin-Greek-Hebrew family, etc. Given these criteria then, only the colonizers have language in the full sense; therefore, their monolinguism—to them, theirs was the only “real language.” “Monolanguaging” on the other hand, is the term I want to use to question the communicative interaction between people who perceive themselves as having a language in the full sense, and animal like beings who are assumed to have no language but who can be trained to understand the former well enough to be able to follow their orders and do what they want. To put it simpler, while we can argue now that and how colonality closes communication, it is not like there was no communication at all between colonizers and colonized.
I want to look at one case of what I am calling monolanguaging. This is perhaps the first one as it appears in Columbus’s journal entry on Thursday, October 11th 1492, where the Admiral is narrating the first encounter with the natives of the Guahanahaní island:

In order to win their good will because I could see that they were people who could more easily be won over and converted to our holy faith by kindness than by force, I gave some of them red hats and glass beads that they put around their necks, and many other things of little value, with which they were very pleased and became so friendly that it was a wonder to see. Afterwards they swan out to the ships’ boats where we were and brought … many other things and they bartered with us … They took and gave everything they had with good will, but it seemed to me they were a people who were very poor in everything. They go as naked as their mother bore them … They were well built with handsome bodies and fine features. Their hair is thick, almost like a horse’s tail but short … They are naturally the color of Canary Islanders … They do not carry arms and do not know of them because I showed them some swords and they grasped them by the blade and cut themselves out of ignorance … I saw some who had signs of wounds on their bodies and in sign language I asked them what they were, and they indicated that other people come from other islands nearby and tried to capture them … I believed then and still believe that they come here from the mainland to take them as slaves. They
ought to make good slaves for they are quick intelligence since I notice that they are quick to repeat what I said to them, and I believe that they could easily become Christians, for it seemed to me that they had no religion of their own. God willing, when I come to leave I will bring six of them to Your Highness so that they may learn to speak (Columbus, 1492/1990, pp. 31-33).

The renaissance modern/colonial linguistic paradigm informs Columbus’s impression. On the one hand, he denies the status of language to what the encountered “naked,” “ignorant,” “poor in everything,” gullible, religion-less, and docile natives speak, as he announces he will take some of them to Spain “so that they may learn to speak.” On the other hand, Columbus celebrates the natives’ ability to understand and respond to his sign-language and to repeat what he says as things of great value (like their “well built bodies”) when considering their enslavement.

From a strict Maturanean perspective, this communicative situation does not count as a languaging process because from his perspective the togetherness is exclusively one of mutual affirmation, parity, co-operation, and willingness. Columbus does not see the natives as people with whom he may communicate as peers but as slaves.

In the interaction between master and slave there is no linguistic community of sense strictly speaking; nonetheless there is a form of sociality between them. This is what I want the idea of monolanguaging to convey: a sociality that creates a dehumanizing way of living for peoples who are colonized or enslaved. Slavery or encomienda are not only systems of production but ways of life accompanied by laws, relocation of people in plantations, mines, and missions, and institutions like the whip or the mita. There is a community in the sense that there is an aggregate of people who are together for a particular function; but all that matters is the colonizer’s will, what the master wants with and of these people who are his property.
The person who is the addressee in an act of monolanguaging is someone who must be understood to understand what it is that the master wants, and do it; but her communal ways of life, collective knowledges, and creativity do not matter at all. Given the impossibility of seeing enslaved and colonized peoples as interlocutors there is a lack of communicative disposition on behalf of the master, colonizer. It is as if he were deaf to or couldn’t grasp any possibility of meaning coming out of their mouths. We could hardly speak of a “togetherness” here, but if there gets to be a togetherness in monolanguaging it is one that the colonizer moves not only in the particular direction he wants to go but in the direction that excludes every possible direction that colonized peoples want to give to it. Monolanguaging dehumanizes through the erasure of communal languagings. In this sense, monolanguaging marks a significant difference between communication that is hostile but nevertheless creates a sense of recognition, and incommunicative communication; that is, communication that is one way only as it assumes the other to be silent and incapable of rational expressivity. The paradigm shift thus has allowed us to reveal the difference between rational and “simple communication” as a relation of domination through dehumanization and, consequently, to show the coloniality of language as a process of domination.

Conclusion
In this article I presented a theoretical account of Modernity/Coloniality-Decoloniality research program’s conceptual and methodological approach in respect to studying the relation between race and language. While decolonial options are yet to be formulated, my analysis is a contribution to think and articulate the problem of linguistic and communicative consequences of racialization in such a way that these options can be imagined.

This decolonial critique accomplishes two things. On the one hand, it reveals the logic of modernity/coloniality and sees it as a monologic; that is, as one that closes possible conversations with other ways of knowing and living. One of the ways in which the monologic of modernity/coloniality closes possible conversations is precisely by reducing the
possible interlocutors to beings incapable of interlocution, to “simple communicators.” On the other hand, by exercising a paradigmatic shift, the argument points at the possible interlocutors as beings who are interlocutors in communities of sense that escape the colonial reduction. Thus, as we investigate and move through the transformation that the process of coloniality of language brought, we see that colonized-colonialized people have indeed been transformed, but they are not transformed in ways that can be understood solely from the logic of modernity/coloniality. Or, to employ the concepts I have introduced, as we see colonized-colonialized people together in languaging and the rejection of that togetherness in monolanguaging, we see the importance of languaging as a place of resistance against the grain of monolanguaging.

The point is that to understand the complexity of colonized-colonialized speakers in the long-term process of reduction/transformation/racialization that is the linguistic coloniality, I propose to “see” the colonized-colonialized from the tension of two logics. One is the logic of modernity/coloniality, which this article has unpacked. The other is actually not one single, homogeneous logic but, rather, the variety of logics, technologies, strategies that take up the subjectivity and inter-subjectivity of colonized-colonialized subjects as irreducible to Eurocentric cognitive, economic, public, political-juridical, and religious practices. To deprive colonized-colonialized people of their languages and to force the colonial languages on their tongues sought to deny them as people. But a lot more has to be done in order for that to happen. People have to lose their ability to continue their ways of living together and their languagings. As long as colonized-colonialized peoples continue languaging in their tongues, they continue as much as possible powerfully remembering, reenacting, and performing their way of living-together despite the reduction brought by missionaries, the dispersion brought by slavery, and the universality of modernity and its institutions. Even if they have internalized words from the colonial languages’ domains, even if they have lost significant concepts of their cosmology, colonized-colonialized people
have walked outside the conceptual prison in which they were put by an attempt at domination by linguistic racialization.

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1 Sections of this essay were presented at *Race, Resistance and Reason: Rethinking the Boundaries*, Center for Gender and Intercultural Studies, State University of New York College at Cortland, October 2012 and the *Coloquio Internacional Pensamiento Crítico del Sur: Genealogías y Emergencias*, Centro Científico Tecnológico de Mendoza (Argentina), September 2013. I thank Debora Faccion E Ferreira Pinto for her translation to Portuguese.

2 This is a very sketchy presentation of the MCD collective project in the best of cases. Broadly speaking, this network is associated with the work of a few central figures, chiefly, the Argentinean/Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel, the Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano and the Argentinean/US semiotician and cultural theorist Walter Mignolo. There are, however, a growing number of scholars associated with the group, including Edgardo Lander in Venezuela; Santiago Castro-Gómez, Oscar Guardiola and Eduardo Restrepo in Colombia; Catherine Walsh in Quito; Zulma Palermo in Argentina; Jorge Sanjínés in Bolivia; María Lugones, Freya Schiwy, Fernando Coronil, Ramón Grosfoguel, Jorge Saldivar, Ana Margarita Cervantes-Rodríguez, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and Arturo Escobar in the United States. I count myself among a new generation of decolonial scholars, PhD students or recently graduates from various universities in Ecuador, Mexico, and the US. A complete list of the bibliography produced in the last three decades goes beyond the scope of this article, however some collective volumes produced by the group include: Castro-Gómez and Mendieta, eds. (1998); Castro-Gómez, ed. (2000); Mignolo, ed. (2001 and 2007); Walsh, Schiwy and Castro-Gómez, eds. (2002), Moraña, Dussel and Jáuregui, eds. (2008), Isasi Díaz and Mendieta, eds. (2011). For a genealogy of the collective and its main ideas and projects, “Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise: The Latin American modernity/coloniality Research Program” by Arturo Escobar (2004) is a good place to start, as are the various websites of members and research projects associated with the collective.

3 I am using this pair of terms colonized-colonialized in the same way that Patricio Noboa Viñán (2005, p. 95) introduced the pair “colonizador-colonizadur” (colonizer-colonizer,) which I interpret conveys the difference between colonial situations enforced by the presence of colonial administrations (i.e. colonialism) and colonial situations at a time when colonial administrations have almost been eradicated from the capitalist world-system (i.e. coloniality).

4 The four interconnected domains or spheres of social existence that are the object of capitalist power are according to Quijano: the economic (appropriation of land and its resources and exploitation of labor,) the
control of authority (setting different forms of governmental, legal, financial, and military systems,) the public (enforcing normative sexuality and the naturalization of gender roles through the institution of nuclear family,) and inter-subjectivity (control of culture, subjectivity, and specially knowledge through colonization and education) (Quijano, 2000a, pp. 544-5).

5 “Eurocentrism,” is worth emphasizing, is not the perspective of knowledge of European people but of the Eurocentered world, of those educated under the hegemony of global capitalism.

6 The difference and fit between social classification (race) and process (racialization) comes not from Quijano but from María Lugones’s (2007) and Nelson Maldonado-Torres’s (2007) take on the question of coloniality.

7 Aristotle provided a classification scheme based on matching a basic kind (species) with a set of distinguishing characteristics (differentia) in order to sort things in the world.

8 By “universe” I mean indigenous peoples’ reality and construction of this reality, the material and inter-subjective formations of themselves, of their social relations, of their understanding of and ways of inhabiting the world, of their relations to the environment, etc.

9 “Recursive,” “recurrent,” “recursion,” and similar notions are an important aspect of Maturana’s theorizing and style of theorizing life and living in general, and languaging as a phenomenon of living. Life and living are recursive because they take place in the now, as a flow of changing processes; we live moment to moment according to how we are at that moment which is the result of how we have lived until that moment (Maturana, 1999, pp. 69-70). In respect to languaging, “recursive” indicates that as a process it operates on the product of its own operation, drawing some sort of circularity.

10 Maturana uses the term “love” to refer to these conditions of mutual recognition. “Being in love means making space for one another so that each becomes part of the domain of existence of the other […] Love is a primary constitutive condition and is fundamental of social phenomena are to arise. Only loving relations are social relation” (Maturana, 1990, pp. 17-18; my translation).

11 Although I aim to go beyond Maturana I think it is worth highlighting that one of the important things that his attention to emotions does is that it models an understanding of being that does not rely in the modern understanding of self. Maturana implicitly rejects Max Weber’s instrumental rationality that pretty much is at the bases of all modern paradigms, i.e. the distinction between primary qualities of Reason communicated through philosophical ideas and scientific arguments, and secondary qualities communicated through emotions and feeling. As I have been emphasizing, within Maturana’s theory to speak of a knowing subject abstracted from space, context, location, or body does not make sense.
I am thankful to the anonymous readers of the first version of this article for pushing me to think so much harder about my use of Maturana in connection to uncovering the coloniality of language.

Encomienda was a system, instituted in 1503, under which the Spanish Crown granted a soldier or conquistador in America a track of land of village and conferred the right to demand tribute and forced labor from its inhabitants (Encyclopedia Britannica Online). Mit’a was mandatory public service in the society of the Inca empire, later appropriated, modified, and intensified by the Spanish colonial administration (Diccionario Quechua - Español – Quechua).
References


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