FIVE

The Politics of Data: Gender bias and border mentality in the EEOC Job Category Compliance Chart and how transnational gender mainstreaming can offer best practices for change

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Abstract: This essay examines how the EEOC Compliance Chart obscures and so perpetuates gender inequalities for today’s institutions. The paper explores second and third wave feminist national and global organizing strategies to contemplate best practices for change. Using two models of women's activism the essay puts forward best practices for creating in universities the kind of transnational nonstate activism and advocacy that has created gender mainstreaming success around the world.

“It is precisely by exposing the illusion of the permanence or enduring truth of any particular knowledge of sexual difference that feminism necessarily historicizes history and politics and opens the way for change.”
—Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (1999, 10)

“The borders and walls that are supposed to keep the undesirable ideas out are entrenched habits and patterns of behavior; these habits and patterns are the enemy within.
—Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, The New Mestiza (1987, 79)

Since The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the federal passage of Title VII, all workplaces, including institutions of higher education, that have at least 50 workers and receive federal funding over $50,000 have been required regularly to tally and report their gender and race hiring practices to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Originally, no power of enforcement was given to the EEOC, but when Congress amended Title VII in 1972, among other things, it entitled the EEOC to receive and investigate individual discrimination complaints and, when finding probable cause, to mediate a settlement (Liberman, 2007). One result of the Title VII mandate is the requirement for workplaces to generate annually a Job Category Compliance Chart, which is one chart among many that
condenses into one schema an institution’s workforce composition. While University executives, Affirmative Action Officers, and others attend to the entire document, a look at an institution’s Job Category Compliance Chart is one way to see and quickly assess an institution’s annual hiring practices and trends.

The mandate to record and report gender and race profiles did have the desired effect of creating demographic changes in workplace composition. In the private workplace, EEOC data (Kalev & Dobbin, 2005) indicates that from 1971-2002, in private sector “management jobs in the average establishment,” the percentage of white men went from 87% to 57%; white women went from 9.5% to 28%; black women went from .5% to almost 3%; and black men went from 1.5% to 3.7% (p. 24). Sharon R. Bird (2011) noted that “though the bulk of the gendered organization research focuses on work settings other than universities, most of these research findings are relevant also to universities as workplaces” (p. 204). The trends Kalev and Dobbin discovered in their 1971-2002 longitudinal study of 814 private workplaces, where they found greatest Title VII impact in the 1970s, then diminishing impact “after the 1980s, [when compliance reviews] had significant effects for only white women,” and even less impact in the 1990s, when “compliance reviews… do not show effects” (p. 29), interestingly also speak to the trends in higher education. For instance, from 1996-2010, my home institution, the University of Rhode Island (URI), saw minority representation for total employees go from 8.9% to 11%. Taking into account only the total in ranks comparable to private management jobs (management, professionals, and faculty categories), white men went from 54% to 42%; white women went from 36% to 49%; black women went from .99% to 1.3%; black men went from 2.3% to 1.9%. Additional races, Hispanic, American Indian/Alaskan, and especially Asian/Pacific Islanders, added to these numbers. The dip in black male employees further reflects Kalev and Dobbin’s summary of research that indicates that “employers virtually never met the goals they set” (p. 12), and that black women and black men have not fared as well as one might have expected or hoped (p. 29). Roos (2008), noting in her study of a large state university that between 1976 and 2004 that “African American and Latino faculty show both percentage and actual number declines” (p. 197), has joined others in arguing, “that without constant vigilance, diversity gains can rapidly evaporate” (p. 196).
As is well known, despite EEOC mandates, many institutions of higher education are still far from achieving anything near equity. One usual explanation for this lack of diversity is the historical “pipeline”: fewer women and people of color, especially before 1972, have entered graduate programs, creating a paucity of possible applicants for hire and promotion. But this argument, besides distorting today’s qualified labor pool, obfuscates far greater and deeper systemic issues that perpetuate the lack of equity in higher education. In fact, the percentage of women and minority Ph.D.’s have grown so that as early as 1998, 48% of Ph.D.’s in the US were earned by women (West, 2007, p. 200), and in 2010, over 50% of Ph.D.’s were earned by women (Inside Higher Ed, 2010); as of 2009, 7% and almost 6% of Ph.D.’s were earned by blacks and Hispanics (NSF, 2010) respectively. The 2001-2003 attempts in the University of California system to rectify “serious discrimination against women… in faculty hiring practice” (West, p. 199) reported in their findings that “employment discrimination theory [states that] if the ‘qualified labor pool’ is 48 percent women, but the hires from that pool are only 13 percent women, a prima facie case of discrimination is indicated” (West, p. 202). This case suggests the importance for higher institutions of aiming to reflect in their hiring practices a proportionate percentage of the “qualified labor pool” rather than falling back on the “empty pipeline argument” as a default excuse.

Most importantly, this obfuscation also invites administrators and executives to ignore the deeper ways gender and race bias are embedded in and perpetuated by the institutional structures and policies of universities. Current research (Bird, 2011; Hirsch 2009; Roos 2008; Sturm, 2006; West 2007) charts “how subtle sex biases operate” (Roos, p. 186) within workplace interactions and organizational policies, including practices that control hiring, promotion and tenure, discretionary earnings, research grants, merit pay, language used to assess performance, and “devaluation of the intellectual work that women do, especially when that work focuses on gender” (Roos, p. 191). The qualitative data that Roos, with her colleague Mary Gatta, collected “from a large Arts and Sciences unit of a public research university” (p. 188) also quoted an interviewee as saying, “In short, women have to do twice as much to be judged half as good. Women of color are particularly devalued in the promotion process” (p. 191).
These investigations of the ways “organizational structures, cultures, and practices are gendered” (Bird, 2011) are extremely valuable for generating language and knowledge by which to begin to make conscious and change discriminatory patterns. But there is yet a deeper site of bias in higher education that has yet to be explored, which is in one of the main measuring sticks universities use to assess their structures and progress: the EEOC Job Category Compliance Chart itself. This essay will examine how this chart conceals and so perpetuates both a gender bias and a border mentality (Anzaldúa 1987; Wright 2006) that works against the interests of gender and race equity. Granted the EEOC chart is not in itself instrumental in directing or determining institutional practice. Nor can one say the EEOC chart “is” an institution of higher education. And yet, insofar as the chart reflects, institutionalizes, and thereby normalizes deeper practices of higher education hiring, its structural and bias issues need examining if women and people of color are going to be able to create the new “normative pressure” (Hirsh, 2006) needed to change institutions so women and people of color find representation, success, and “institutional citizenship… both to enable full participation by a diverse citizenry and to enable universities to meet their obligations as institutional citizens of a broader polity” (Sturm, 2006, p. 304).

To date, as Sharon Bird (2011) has stated, “One key problem [in solving gender inequities] is that many, if not most, leaders in powerful decision-making roles in universities continue to embrace women-centered explanations for gender disparities” (p. 202). Not only does this institutional approach essentialize women, neglect to respect important gender-focused issues such as access, resources, and control, and ignore the close relationship between gender and race, but such restricted explanations also perpetuate narrowness and exceptionalism that rely on unquestioned notions of Western, white, male supremacy, rather than embracing global, postcolonial, and poststructuralist approaches to understanding oppression. This essay, in contrast, looks at “the globality of this story” (Wright, 2006, p. 9) so as to shift the paradigm of privilege inherent in the narrow, binary, women-centered approach to a more border-crossing, gender-centered approach, and to take advantage of global best practices that have helped create gender mainstreaming in hundreds of countries around the world (Basu, 2010; True & Mintrom, 2001). In the process, the essay takes Melissa Wright’s reframing of Gloria Anzaldúa’s exhortation to “reimagin[e] the
border not as the place of division but as the unified seam” (Wright, p. 95) to suggest how and why the EEOC Chart, used as an institutional measuring stick and viewed as a colonizing discourse (Mohanty, 1991), may be yet more regressive than most realize. Exploring the normative gender bias and border mentality concealed in the EEOC Chart, and investigating global solutions to such problems, the essay offers some crucial proactive ways by which activists can and must pressure institutions to address and redesign normalized and normalizing deep structures that currently disadvantage women and people of color.

Creating this pressure on institutions is crucial to making change. In her study of 2,166 establishments from the EEO-1 national database to document the “The Impact of Discrimination Charges, Legal Environments, and Organizational Conditions on Workplace Segregation” (2009), labor sociologist Elizabeth Hirsh found that “normative pressure” is “the driving force behind legal compliance and organizational change” (p. 248). Her emphasis on the importance of new “normative pressure” makes it important to ask—if the measuring stick for compliance and change conceals gender-biased “normative standards” that serve to separate and silence those groups and individuals who need to exert pressure to change the system that oppresses them, how then will change come about?

To get at the concealed gender bias inherent in the EEOC Compliance Chart, I am relying on the Chart from my home institution. The use of this Chart, which is in the public domain, is not meant to imply URI’s numbers can speak for another institution’s. Nor do I mean to point a maligning finger at URI, especially since the Charts from many other institutions closely resemble the one from URI. I mean only to rely on numbers I know and can easily trace to allow me to reveal the hidden gender biases and border mentality in the structure and assumptions of the chart itself. In fact, when I first picked up the URI Chart, I didn’t expect to find hidden biases. I was merely curious about the number of women and people of color working at various levels and was checking the Chart as part of an effort by the Equity Council and President’s Commission on the Status of Women to pressure the administration to hire and promote more women and people of color.

What I discovered in terms of race was discouraging but, sad to
say, not surprising. I will explore later how this lack of hiring of people of color is connected to assumptions and structures that also hinder equitable hiring and compensation of women.

What I discovered in terms of gender, given the historical pipeline, didn’t at first look all that bad or unexpected. The Executive/Administrative balance—83 males and 68 females—didn’t seem terrible, all considered. The faculty distribution—414 males and 319 females—also didn’t seem as bad as it could have been. The other categories also showed fairly predictable gendered patterns, not all that surprising given the overall gendered division of labor in our world.

But when I went to the faculty American Association of University Professors (AAUP) union office to get a more detailed breakdown of faculty by gender and salary, the new information suddenly made me question both the EEOC Chart and, in Joan Wallach Scott’s words, “how hierarchies are constructed and perpetuated” according to “subjective and collective meanings of women and men as categories of identity” (1999, p. 6). The fact that the EEOC chart contains a hidden gender bias is not in itself surprising. Laura Lee Downs (2004) has spoken to the potential gender warp of such an historical artifact when she explains: “who g[ets] hired for specific work roles depend[s] largely on how individual employers perceiv[e] the particular qualities of men and women, boys and girls” (p. 17). Sharon Bird ((2011) also has explained:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Title</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive/Administrative</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Non Faculty</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical/Para-professional</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Crafts</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service/ Maintenance</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>2448</td>
<td>1334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the post-World War II era the distinction between universities as research-focused and liberal arts colleges as teaching-focused corresponded with the gendered segregation of educational institutions. Women faculty were commonly excluded from research-intensive disciplines and over-represented in teaching colleges and in applied disciplines in universities. University structures for evaluating faculty performance reflected similar gender distinctions. (p. 208)

The structure and categories of the EEOC chart understandably reflect late 1950’s and early 1960’s assumptions and patterns—conscious and unconscious—of gendered forms of production and employment that came along with the post-war re-gendering of “work” and “home.”

But a closer look at the 2009 faculty figures—414 males and 319 females—made the picture instantly more complicated and alarming when I began to think about who really has power at URI. Level III full professors numbered 28 females and 129 males. Full Professor Levels I and II, while showing shifting gender numbers coming up the pipeline, still had considerable gender imbalance at 59 females and 100 males. Insofar as power connects to numbers and salary levels, one can quickly see where power lies.

One might wish to argue at this point that history explains and justifies the gender and earning power disparities. One might also wish to argue that perusing the lower faculty levels shows reassuring greater numbers of women coming up the pipeline. In terms of pure numbers, the gender distributions are fairly good. At the 2009 Associate Level II are slightly more women than men (37 females, 33 males). The Associate Level I has 54 females, 46 males. Even more promising, perhaps, the Assistant Professor Level II has twice as many women (45 females, 22 males). Assistant Professor Level I has 30 females and 28 males. Lecturers at Level II also seemed to have achieved equity (24 females, 23 males), while the numbers for Level I Lecturers are 12 females and 7 males.

But behind these glossy numbers are important gender disparities in access, control, and resources that the EEOC chart masks. For
instance, in terms of access to promotion, the EEOC chart does not distinguish between tenure-track Assistant Professors (75 females, 50 males) and Appendix F (non-tenure track) Assistant Professors (19 females and 3 males), a distribution that might make one question why there are so many female Appendix F professors whose labor the university relies on but does not invest in long-term through the tenure system. Nor does the EEOC chart indicate that Lecturers, whose numbers are incorporated into “faculty,” have no promise of pay raise, promotion, or, in many cases, union or institutional voting power. The EEOC Chart also does not delineate the poorly paid part-time faculty—at URI, about 40% of the total teaching staff—upon which many universities depend. Once one also looks closely at faculty salaries, the Chart gender tally of faculty, which might make one feel optimistic at first glance, has no way of revealing that in 2010-2011, Assistant Professor salaries ranged from around $50K to 75K, depending on the field and College—wi}
(Basu, 2010, p. 21, 103, 123, 180, 202, 248, 257), is that if most of the “Executives” are men who have signatory and budget authority, whereas most of the “Administrative” personnel are women without such authority, the women are powerless. In terms of creating a potential mass of voters or spokespeople capable of mobilizing the needed normative pressure essential for change, the fact that at URI the “Administrative” workers belong to one union (PSA) controlled by the State, while “executives” at URI are not unionized and so not subject to union constraints negotiated through the State, further divides these two ostensibly powerful groups.

At each tier of the EEOC chart, in fact, one sees such doubly reinforced separation because of the hierarchical tier itself and several different union affiliations. The Professional Non-faculty at URI are represented by different unions (PSA and PTAA), managers and workers, respectively, which separates them from each other, from the Faculty union (AAUP), from some of the Administrator’s union (PSA), and from the Executive’s nonunion. Clerical workers belong to Council 94, which is part of ACT NEA, and, unlike the already mentioned unions, report to the State, not the RI Board of Governors. Technical/Para-professional workers do overlap with some of the Professional Non-faculty category (PTAA), but Skilled Craft workers and Service/Maintenance workers belong to Council 94. Perhaps one could argue that having different unions for different categories of workers is par for the course. Or perhaps one could argue there’s nothing keeping different unions from talking with each other, even organizing with each other. But at least at URI, in ways the divisions of the Chart both reflect and implicitly valorize, this kind of cross-communication does not happen except around contract negotiations. Most of the unions, however, are scheduled to negotiate their contracts at different times, another way in which power patterns, normalized in the Chart, seem especially determined to keep apart potential collaborative voices for creating “pressure” and change.

The ways different categories of workers also feel pitted against each other, especially in regard to gender issues, further serves to reinforce such a border mentality. For instance, in the Professional Non-Faculty tier, the Chart might give reason to applaud that at least here more women (332) than men (220) have this rank. But what the chart doesn’t show is that the pay disparity is large
between those who work as faculty with Ph.D.’s in, say, Psychology, and those with Ph.D.’s who work a tier down as school psychologists in the counseling center. Not surprisingly, in keeping with national gendered patterns, most of the URI Counseling Center psychologists are women. At the Clerical level, the predictable gender disparity (291 women, 11 men) also helps explain the discouraging lack of Executive attention to bettering salaries and working conditions, despite this group’s claim that non-faculty workers represent two-thirds of all of URI employees. Likewise, is it any surprise that Clerical Workers, who often have a higher educational level than those in Skilled Crafts (3 women, 43 men), are paid less than many of the Skilled Crafts workers, who are mostly male?

Again: as I report these various figures, it is not my point to malign URI for what are the deeply embedded gender-biased labor patterns and assumptions one sees at many institutions. My point is rather to expose the gender biases and border mentality concealed in the EEOC chart, a major measuring stick and source of validation for institutions of higher education, and to probe the deeper structural qualities this Chart depends upon, which mitigate against the very gender and race equity success it is designed to record and work toward. Do most people already know the Chart is deceptive as it presents data? Maybe. But have they thought through how the deception and structure are symptomatic of much deeper patterns of gendered and racial oppression? Judging from the surprise of administrators, faculty, and staff with whom I have shared this essay and information, I would have to say no. Even if people are aware of the facts the chart glosses over, they are not aware of how profoundly the structures inherent in this measuring stick speak to why institutions of higher education have not been able—or do not want?—to achieve gender and race equity. Perhaps more alarmingly, they may not have investigated how deeply the border mentality underlying the Chart reinforces what Melissa Wright (2006) has called “the myth of the disposable woman.”

Let me first articulate the Chart’s obstacles to achieving equity, which Hirsh’s findings (2009) help illuminate. In her extensive research, Hirsh found “the easiest way for establishments to desegregate” and thereby change their gender and race profile is “to promote workers from an occupational category in which their
ascriptive group is over-represented into an occupational category in which the group is underrepresented” (p. 251). Where, however, the “division of labor is highly differentiated,” Hirsh noted, and where there are more “occupational categories,” it’s “easier to segregate workers along ascriptive lines” and harder to change their positioning (p. 251). The problem, she warned, is that the more defined the rungs, and the farther apart they are, the less mobility is possible, and the less likely are race and gender equity shifts (p. 251). One can see how the doubly reinforced compartmentalizing valorized in the EEOC Chart mitigates against the mobility or “pressure” needed to effect equity.

Hirsh’s finding that one needs “a critical mass” (2009, p. 44) of women at the top to change institutional behavior also points not only to power problems at the top, but power problems in each rung. On the one hand, her finding that where managers have power they can influence change, but if they are powerless they are less likely to influence change, shows why the concealed power imbalance between “Executive” and Administrative” is significant: this latter group of mostly women, having no power, are less likely to be able to influence change. But Hirsh’s finding pertains also and significantly to gender equity at lower rungs. “Due to ingroup [sic] preferences and general concerns for equity,” Hirsh noted, “female and minority managers may be especially likely to promote job opportunities for female and minority employees, thereby loosening longstanding patterns of occupational segregation” (p. 251). If one assumes from experience that substantial gender changes at the top are rare, one might suppose that in the lower ranks there is a more realistic hope of “promot[ing] job opportunities for female and minority employees.” Hirsh’s finding suggests that such shifts at lower rungs might produce a ripple effect throughout the institution. But where the inner rungs also seem structured and compartmentalized in a way that disempowers women, such systemic change is also unlikely to occur. Hirsh further discovered that “concerns for equity may also make female and minority leadership more responsive to legal pressures” (p. 251)—another reason significant gender and minority representation is especially necessary. Perhaps keeping women out of these top positions in itself helps spare institutions from needing to be “responsive to legal pressures.”

There is one last reason supported by Hirsh’s findings (2009) to be concerned about the gender biases and constraints the EEOC chart
conceals. According to Hirsh’s findings, boycotts, participation, and visibility are the primary mechanisms by which to create pressure to change institutions (p. 249). The strongest impact on change, she discovered, is “the media effect” (p. 266). She has argued that in terms of generating pressure to change “normative standards” and “compe[1] organizations to voluntarily behave in ways consistent with the law,” those who are disadvantaged by policies and norms—women and minorities—need to organize to “identify” and “publicize” noncompliance (p. 268).

But how, one might ask, are the people who are underpaid, understaffed, over-extended, under-assured of job security, and, in the case of faculty, under-recognized in promotion and tenure decisions for their service, going to have the time or incentive to organize so as to get in “the news”?

In her essay, “Mobilization among women academics: the interplay between feminism and professionalism” (2008), Jeni Hart, a professor in the Department of Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis at the University of Missouri at Columbia, made clear several obstacles to “getting in the news” that many women in higher education institutions already recognize, obstacles that substantiate the pressures women feel not to organize. According to Hart, The Association for Women Faculty at the University of Arizona, a group that saw itself as “professional first, feminist second” (p. 195), sought “to work in concert with the administration,” and “felt the administration could be trusted” (p. 190). But some of the women faculty said “that belonging to a feminist group could compromise their reputation and threaten tenure and promotion” (p. 191). The group’s strategy to downplay “feminism,” Hart reported, along with their investment in seeing being feminist and professional as “mutually exclusive” (p. 191), did not, however, lead them to affect “pressure” for change. It seems not surprising to learn that for this group, which Hart said was run “hierarchically” by a board (p. 193), “interest lagged” since many members “didn’t stay” (p. 198). Hart speculated that this waning interest resulted from one of four causes: the “perception the women’s movement was over”: “increasing workload” that gave women less time for service “especially when it wasn’t rewarded for promotion and tenure”; “more loyalty to professional identities and individual disciplines”; and the case of anti-feminist harassment at the time toward Anne Kolodny, which “may have scared people away” (p. 202).
The other feminist group Hart studied, the Faculty Women’s Caucus at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, seems to have had more success. According to Hart, this group saw themselves as “more confrontational and active,” “independent,” and focused on “keep[ing] an eye on the administration” so as to “prod them” when necessary (p. 196). Hart reported that unlike the other group, which felt they “couldn’t speak for women in some ways” because they “ha[d] to answer to the President,” this group not only didn’t feel “responsible to” the administration, but felt keeping separate was necessary “to be effective” (p. 196). Their effective “separatist” strategy would seem to counter my argument that we need to break down boundaries and allow for fewer rungs and more permeability. But at the same time, this organizing from within the ranks so as to create pressure seems important to note. The structure of the Women’s Caucus also speaks to an important shift. Hart described the governance as “nonhierarchical,” with “not just chairs assum[ing] leadership” (p. 198). According to Hart, there were no dues, no formal membership (so untenured women were more likely to come, not fearing officially sanction in promotion and tenure), open invitations to all women faculty, and focus on an issue until it was resolved. The agenda focused on “broad change to effect many women and systemic changes” (p. 199) across boundaries—again, something the structures and border mentality behind the EEOC chart mitigate against.

Hart’s study, despite the groups’ differences, concluded with two important points that speak to how the Chart misrepresents the power of women by lumping all male and all female faculty together in a binary fashion. First, one might think, based on the somewhat equal (and improving?) numbers of female faculty, that an institution is making substantial progress in enriching the power of women with tenure who, according to Hart’s findings, “are more likely and willing to rock the boat” (p. 204). But the fact is, as the Chart conceals, there are inadequate numbers of tenured and senior women faculty present, to “rock the boat.” Insofar as the MIT Study (1999) of women faculty in science, along with other more recent research (Roos, 2008), found that “senior women described themselves as ‘invisible’ and ‘marginalized,’ while junior faculty women felt well supported,” a feeling senior women actually had as junior faculty (Roos, p. 186), the Chart’s glossing over the relative paucity of senior women faculty seems as much a symptom as a description of the current system. Second, based on
the somewhat balanced total numbers of men and women, and the large number of women present at an institution, one might also think that and institution is making progress “creating a critical mass and safe space for all women.” But, in truth, the Chart reflects the isolation of women compartmentalized into separate voting and working groups.

This compartmentalizing suggests a more disconcerting facet of the Chart if and when one treats it as a piece of institutional discourse or “story.” In her book *Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism* (2006), Melissa Wright has analyzed the discourse or “story” that produces and perpetuates “the myth of disposable women,” more particularly, the “disposable third world woman.” Wright has defined this “story” as one that “serves as a vehicle for establishing the normative characteristics and behaviors of the disposable third world woman” (p. 5). She has defined “the third world woman... as a normalized subject who reaffirms explicit relations of power and hierarchy” (p. 5). In drawing the distinction between “women” and “woman,” Wright has echoed Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (1991) definition of “woman” as “the cultural and ideological composite Other produced by hegemony,” which essentializes women as homogenous and monolithic, without either recognizing them as “real material subjects of collective histories” or dismantling the binary system that engenders this view. Critiquing the colonizing discourse of “third world women,” Wright has also reflected Mohanty’s critique of Western imperialist notions of “third world women” as monolithic and inferior to Western (white) women. By “disposable women,” Wright has defined a “story” in which women’s labor is valued and essential to the capitalist system at the same time women are inevitably (and notoriously) used up and replaced, a system of use and disposability upon which the capitalist system rests. In all, Wright’s insights into “disposable women,” her observation that “a masculine subject only gains shape as a particular kind of employee through the materialization of the female subject who outlines him by way of her opposition” (p. 13), and her recognition that “evidence of [the managers’] worth pivots on their ability to both produce and manage her most valuable labor” (p. 27) make me ponder whether the Chart, as institutional discourse, doesn’t also have most deeply embedded this idea and necessity of “the disposable woman”—necessary only because without her subordination, the male dominated power structure would not take its current and self-perpetuating form. The resemblance between
the power dynamics of institutions of higher education and of the Chinese and Mexican maquiladoras also helps reveal which practices might be especially important for institutions to adopt if they wish to change the embedded structures (Bird, 2011; Kalev & Dobbins, 2005) and mentalities that hold back women, people of color, and, by extension, universities from achieving “full participation by a diverse citizenry” (Sturm, 2006, p. 304).

But first, to clarify: In making such a comparison between workplaces, I do not mean to imply that women in higher education materially resemble “disposable third world women”; their opportunities and privileges generally remove them from the material concerns of the female (or male) Mexican or Chinese factory worker. Nor do I mean to group all women together. But I do mean to suggest that the comparison of workplaces illuminates how the Chart and the story it represents build on and perpetuate an embedded notion of “disposable women.” In studying the capitalist maquiladora systems, in keeping with Marx and Joan Scott (1999), Wright has stressed how “the laboring body, under capitalist conditions, emerges as an embodied site of exploitation and accumulation” (p. 13.) She has also incorporated Judith Butler’s argument “that the human body, as well as the subject associated with it, is always a ‘matter of production’… [and] always materializing” (in Wright, p. 13), one reason the ongoing production of the myth of disposable women could be said to serve a purpose: to perpetuate the system that depends upon it. Thus Wright has also argued, “to sabotage the myth is to strike a blow at the numerous hierarchies that rely upon its constant repetition” (p. 15).

Sharon Bird (2011), analyzing “What’s gendered about universities as incongruous bureaucratic structures” (2011), has also used language and invoked structures that closely resemble the patriarchal factory structures Wright has studied. Of universities, Bird has said:

The segregation of academic disciplines and institutions, the construction of faculty and administrative roles in ways that are more consistent with men’s lives, and the maintenance of evaluation processes that disproportionately value the disciplines and activities that men dominate are all examples of how university structures and associated cultures and practices are
gendered. These factors, in turn, influence future university policies and the structuring of jobs, the ways in which faculty members are evaluated and men’s dominance of powerful decision-making university positions (National Research Council [U.S.], 2006). (in Bird, p. 208-209)

Bird and Roos (2008) have further noted how the male and female spheres carry distinct opportunities and privileges. Whether related to “work-life balance issues…. [that] disproportionately hinder women’s opportunities” for collaborating in research or participating in networks” (Bird, p. 209) or “the likelihood that men will compare their own routine practices, aspirations and levels of compensation with those of other men, and that women will compare their own practices and so forth primarily with those of other women” (Bird, p. 209) or gendered inequities in merit pay (Roos, 2008, p.188, 193), research allocation (Bird, p. 206, 207; Roos, p. 194), decision-making power (Bird, p. 204, 210), and gendered internalization of expectations (Bird, p. 217), these researchers have made clear how deeply a binary gendered system reflects and shapes the power structure. Put most tersely, as spoken by one of the maquiladora managers Wright has quoted, both systems seem built on and keen to perpetuate one key misassumption: “The men like to stand. Women don’t like to stand” (p. 60).

Both gendered systems also seem significantly to depend upon and perpetuate what Wright has defined as a clear symbiosis yet dividing line between males and females, whereby “these male/female bits must join together… [but] the flexible supervisor is never to have his identity confused with the women working under him, but he must reveal who he is through what she does” (p. 62). The three-tiered hierarchy Wright has described for the maquiladoras—women “sitting” and doing their work, Mexican men standing behind them and supervising, but not reaching to touch their work for fear of crossing the line into feminized labor, and higher supervisors (white men) looking down onto the floor in a panopticon of privilege—is in fact very suggestive of many university power structures. Most interesting may be the extent to which the hierarchy depends on people of color and lower class being closely tied not to the white supervisors but to “the disposable women,” their fates and futures intertwined. In this
“system that relies so powerfully on the supervisor’s ability to preserve female workers’ disposability while guaranteeing the exercise of quality labor” (Wright, p. 69), people of color and lower class find themselves positioned on the floor, not up in the window. Wright has concluded:

The discourses that produce these variably sexed and ethnic bodies around the concept of differential degrees of vision thus reaffirm the significance of this concept as an apparatus of social control within a model of development that privileges those with total vision as more developed over those who cannot see as much or as far. And this privileging reifies a stubborn belief, still prevalent throughout the maquiladora industry, of Mexicans, in general, as less visionary and, consequently, less modern than the U.S. and European administrators of their employers. (p. 65)

If one substitutes “universities” for “maquiladora industry,” and “people of color and lower class” for “Mexicans,” one can imagine how the system Wright has analyzed applies also to many universities as their story gets told—or not told—via the EEOC Chart that both reflects and normalizes systemic gender and race inequities.

How, then, change this deeply entrenched system of gender and race inequity? Given the border mentality and hierarchies that work pervasively at all levels of these “stories,” crossing borders and looking not hierarchically but “transnationally” seems like a start. One successful strategy, documented by Sharon Bird (2011), has been to use a case study at a large Midwestern university to bring together 11 people in a 4.5-hour workshop: this included faculty (some tenured, some not) from five different academic departments, three department heads, a college-level administrator, and nonfaculty professionals. The results were encouraging—though men and women tended to enter with different assumptions and views, and though some still left with those views intact, their awareness of gendered issues they didn’t normally see or understand improved and invited further discussion. The curious disadvantage of this set-up was the uneasiness the untenured faculty felt in the midst of others who were tenured or in positions of greater power, testament to the power of the border mentalities that define many universities.
Another useful approach is to learn from the global best practices that have created successful gender mainstreaming in other places in the world. Interestingly enough, the transnational (as opposed to international) networking and efforts in these countries have proved most successful. In their essay, “Transnational networks and policy diffusion: the case of gender mainstreaming” (2001), Jacqui True and Michael Mintrom explored how, since 1995, with an “unprecedented speed of adoption... state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming” took place in over 100 countries (p. 28). True and Mintrom did an “event history analysis of 157 nation-states from 1975-1998 to assess how various national and transnational factors... affected the timing and type of the institutional changes these states have made” (p. 27). Their findings are a useful place to start to find practices that could benefit people in their efforts to redress the higher education structures, categories, and assumptions underlying the EEOC Chart.

A few of their findings are refreshing, especially given the financial crisis so many institutions are currently facing, and the frequent excuse, “we don’t have the money to do that.” They found that the amount of money available or allocated to government resources or agencies did not have a significant bearing on successful gender mainstreaming initiatives or results (p. 49). They also discovered that signatures from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)—in other words, lip service—did not dictate which countries would move quickly toward gender mainstreaming. They also found it was not international efforts or intergovernmental pressures that led to gender mainstreaming, but internal and “transnational” efforts that created change (p. 47). This finding that “the primary force driving the diffusion of gender mainstreaming bureaucracies” is the “transnational networking of nonstate actors” (p. 50) can be interestingly translated into a higher education institutional framework: If institutions of higher education truly want to effect gender equity—whether they want to do this is still up for question—this finding suggests they will need to address the structural and organizational factors within and across their “nation-states”—their Colleges, Departments, and levels of employees—that keep people apart and seemingly pitted against each other. In her work, Susan P. Sturm (2006) has especially recognized and advocated for “organizational catalysts”—“individuals who operate [significantly] at the convergence of
different domains and levels of activity” and who “cultivat[e] new ‘communities of practice’ among individuals who share common interests, experiences, or concerns but otherwise lack opportunities to connect (p. 287).

Change would need to include several idealistic and unlikely propositions, but proposing them is a start. Institutions would need to encourage across-boundary communication, create incentives to encourage such rapport, and do away with disincentives for rapport, including gender-entrenched unfair pay and poor working conditions that create antagonisms. They would also need to rethink the divisive union and pay structures that pit one power group against the other, including be willing to create shared contract negotiation deadlines so as to encourage union and faculty-staff coalitions.

True and Mintrom’s other findings also offer more realistic strategies workers could adopt. Their articulation of the “key role of transnational advocacy networks,” along with their finding that advocacy networks have the greatest potential “when political structures of nation states [read universities] are open to new voices and new ideas” and “when people sympathetic to those voices and ideas actually hold important decision-making power” (p. 51), provides incentive for our own actions. While many of us do not have the power to put women into “important decision-making positions,” the ability to open ourselves and open others to “new voices and new ideas” lies in our own hands. True and Mintrom asserted that “transnational network variables lead to greater likelihood of adoption than international norms variables” (p. 49). This internal networking could inspire us to work more across internal boundaries and to work more between and among universities nationwide to form larger coalitions. The nature of governmental and nongovernmental “presence at conferences and the number of NGO’s and INGO’s with local presence [also] had significant influence on state policy change” (p. 47). Perhaps the more communication, collaborating, and activist strategizing women have at conferences, the more pressure for gender mainstreming we can and will create. They also found, not unexpectedly, that the “degree of democracy” was also a “highly significant indicator” for gender mainstreaming success (p. 49). While this “degree of democracy” might appear to exist within a university, the wage and power disparities inherent in the EEOC chart suggest otherwise.
Finally, in terms of women succeeding in higher education, two of their findings reinforce what many already suspect about conditions that catalyze successful gender mainstreaming. The first, that “the higher the proportion of women gaining formal education relative to men is significant” (p. 49), seems already realizable, as one sees from the numbers of women attending higher education, graduating, and going on to receive doctorates. The second, however, that the “percentage of women as a proportion of government ministers is significant” while the “percentage of women as a proportion of parliamentarians is not” (p. 49), needs to exhort Executives to take heed: where institutions truly wish to create gender equity, they must expeditiously increase the number of women at the top.

All of these examples and studies lead to several concrete suggestions for how we can arrive at strategies and best practices for achieving gender equity in higher education. When we gather, we need to do it across boundaries—administrators, staff, faculty, adjuncts, grad students, and undergraduates. When we hear the excuse, “no money for that,” we need to realize this response is a subterfuge. We do not need money to change policy or gender climate. When we seek to make change, we need to capitalize on our “transnational” “nonstate actors” and activities. We also need to enlist and use the media more, which is perhaps one reason the 2010 National Women’s Studies Association Conference featured an all-day op-ed workshop. More than anything else, we need to insist on having more women in top decision-making positions, ideally at least thirty-percent. As we also try to effect a major paradigm shift away from normalized and static “women-centered” institutional thinking, toward “gender-centered” institutional thinking that plans around equal access, resources, and control, it would be immensely helpful if we could create pressure to lay bare and reconfigure the EEOC Compliance Chart, to bring it up to date so as to guarantee that the official measuring stick and story by which higher education congratulates itself for meeting standards no longer perpetuates its own gender-biased norms.
REFERENCES


i Jody Lisberger, Ph. D., is an Assistant Professor in the Women’s Studies Department at the University of Rhode Island.

ii This figure and the figure for Lecturers Level are taken from 2010 instead of 2009 because when confirming numbers, the AAUP office could no longer access numbers for 2009.

iii Data provided by the URI Human Resources Department.

iv Data provided by the URI American Association of University Professors (AAUP) union.